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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect of stringent environmental regulations on firms' environmental 
practices, economic performance, and environmental innovation. Reducing COD levels by 10% 
relative to 2005 levels is an aim of the Chinese 11th Five-Year Plan. Using a difference-in-
differences framework based on a comprehensive firm-level dataset, we find that more stringent 
environmental regulations faced by firms are positively associated with a greater probability of 
reducing COD emissions; also, there exists an evident heterogeneous effect across industries with 
different pollution intensities. Stricter environmental regulations also account for the sharp 
decline in firms' profits, capital, and labor. After executing a complete chain of tests of the 
underlying mechanisms, we find that firms rely more on recycling and abatement investment than 
on innovations when meeting environmental requirements.
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1 Introduction
From 2006 to 2010, emissions of major regulated water pollutants such as chemical oxygen
demand (COD) from Chinese manufacturing fell by 23.1% relative to the 2005 level, even
as China has boosted its manufacturing output by 137.5%.1 When looking into the pattern
of the cleanup shown in Figure 1, we find the turning point first appearing in 2006, the
starting year of China’s 11th Five-Year Plan characterized by stringent emissions target
control and enforcement. This suggests a link between environmental improvement and
environmental regulations. Have stringent environmental regulations contributed to a
cleanup? And, if so, to what extent? What are the main driving forces for the effect?
Figure 1: Chemical Oxygen Demand Emissions in Chinese Manufacturing
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In this paper, we study the effects of stringent environmental regulations on firms’
pollution emissions and their related economic performance, and, more importantly, we
also study the driving forces behind firms’ responses. Even though historically estab-
lished from the 9th Five-Year Plan, emissions target control in China was not seriously
pursued until the 11th Five-Year Plan. Following a failure to abate during the 9th and 10th
Five-Year Plan, China began to strengthen emissions reduction target schemes by sub-
dividing mandatory national emissions targets among all levels of government and in
the end, polluters. Legal enforcement was enhanced by imposing comprehensive legal
liabilities, making enforcement part of governmental officers’ achievement evaluations,
1COD is an indicative measure of the amount of oxygen that can be consumed by reactions in a volume
of water to reflect water quality. In China, COD emissions have been rigorously regulated since the 1980s.
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accountability, and promotion prospects, as well as the introduction of stricter adminis-
trative penalties for polluters. The large variation of regulatory stringency among cities
due to disparate emissions control targets set from central to local government is help-
ful in identifying causal effects between environmental regulations and firms’ response,
and how it varied across industries. Moreover, facilitated by the mandatory COD emis-
sions reduction target scheme substantively reinforced by the 11th Five-Year Plan since
2006, we mainly rely on difference-in-differences (DID) approach to study the effect of
environmental regulations before and after 2006.
To begin, we document three stylized facts pertaining to COD emissions from manu-
facturing in China through a set of analyses. First, faced with different environmental reg-
ulation stringency, firms in tightly regulated regions reduce more pollutants than those
in loosely regulated regions. Second, the effect of environmental regulation stringency
on firms’ pollution emissions varied across industries with different polluting intensity.
Industrial polluting intensity positively reinforces the effect of environmental regulation
stringency on firms’ pollution reduction. Third, a "composition effect" adjustment of mar-
ket share of each industry and "technique effect" lowered pollution intensity brought by
technological progress are both responsible for a decline in water pollutants from Chinese
manufacturing upon stricter environmental regulations, whereas the "technique effect" is
the predominant causal factor accounting for environmental improvement.
We construct a rich firm-level panel dataset drawing from multiple sources: firm-
level pollution data from the Annual Environmental Survey of Polluting Firms (AESPF),
firm-level economic data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF), firms’ green
patent data from the Patent Dataset, maintained by the China National Intellectual Prop-
erty Administration (CNIPA), firms’ environmental penalty data from the Institute of
Public and Environmental Affairs (IPEA), and city-level data from statistical yearbooks.
This dataset contains rich information on firm-level and city-level variables, including
environmental regulation stringency and firms’ environment-related activities, economic
performance, patent, and legal enforcement.
We then employ a DID strategy to study the effect of environmental regulation strin-
gency. We find that, more stringent environmental regulations faced by firms are posi-
tively associated greater probability of reducing COD emissions after 2006. For example,
among all the large cities, the COD emissions reduction magnitude in Shanghai, which
ranks first in environmental regulation stringency concerning COD emissions reduction
target, is nearly 30% larger than that of Kunming, the city with the lowest control tar-
get. A with-in firm decomposition further shows that, pertaining to changes in pollu-
tion reduction across cities with different environmental regulation stringency after 2006,
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around 30% of them can be explained by within-firm "scale effect", that is, a drop in firms’
total output, whereas 70% of them can be explained by within-firm "technique effect", in-
cluding but not limited to the adoption of pollution abatement facilities, introduction of
cleaner production processes and recycling use of energy inputs. Our baseline results are
further proved by a differential time trends test and robustness check on other pollutants.
In order to consider large variation in COD pollution intensity across industries, we
study heterogeneous effects to verify whether industrial polluting intensity positively
reinforces the effect of environmental regulation stringency on firms’ pollution reduction.
We find that, firms which belong to heavily polluting industries located in cities with
more stringent environmental regulations cut down much more on pollutants, compared
with their intra-city counterparts in less-polluting industries. The greater responsiveness
of firms in heavily polluting industries to more stringent environmental regulations lends
solid evidence to our stylized facts about the inter-industry allocation.
To find out whether more stringent environmental regulations have stimulated firms
to become light green or bright green, we execute a broad spectrum of tests about recy-
cling practice (recycling of wastewater), adoption of pollution abatement facilities (waste
water treatment), and firms’ technological progress (green patents), among others.2 First,
we assess whether the tightened legal enforcement on emissions target controls increased
on the probability that firms would be punished after 2006. Second, we employ a finer
within-firm decomposition by introducing another pollutant, effluent, which is industrial
wastewater discharged into the environment. We find that, the effect of environmental
regulation stringency on COD emissions reduction is mostly attributable to decreased
discharge of effluent, and the decline is much more distinct for heavily polluting indus-
tries. Third, we examine the adjustment of firm’s total water consumption and freshwater
consumption per unit of output affected by environmental regulations. Fourth, according
to our tests, the increasing use of control devices and their treatment capacity is higher for
firms in cities with stringent environmental regulations than their counterparts in cities
2Despite the origins in Hicks (1963) and Porter (1991) on induced innovation, we still seperate differ-
ent types of environmentally friendly technologies. When it comes to COD emissions, the first category is
end-of-pipe technologies, which directly treat wastewater to reduce COD levels. End-of-pipe technologies
are called treatment technologies. The second category of technologies adopted in freshwater saving and
wastewater recycling objectively reduce COD levels. They are called recycling technologies. The last cate-
gory, called green innovations, improves production techniques and processes to reduce COD levels at the
source. When faced with various green technologies, firms might adopt treatment technologies and recycling
technologies to reduce pollution. Here, we refer to this approach as "light green". Or they might innovate,
especially pertaining to green innovations, through green patent applications. This pattern is informative
about firms’ inherent innovation strength and generally followed by better environmental performance.
Here, we refer to this approach as "bright green", following the environmental politics literature. Whether
firms are greening lightly or brightly is critical in understanding the whole scenario about driving forces,
and this knowledge further affects firms’ improved environmental performance.
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with weaker environmental regulations after 2006. Relative to firms in cleaner indus-
tries, firms in dirtier industries tend to be more progressive in expanding pollution treat-
ment capabilities. Last, we focus on firm’s performance in green innovation as a result
of stricter environmental regulations. However, there is little evidence that strict envi-
ronmental regulations lead to an increase in green patents and water-related green patent
applications, regardless of what industry firms belong to. Therefore, we are able to infer
that, emissions target controls, at least during the 11th Five-Year Plan, failed to stimulate
firms to become "bright green" innovators, maybe because other lower-cost "light green"
countermeasures, such as pollution abatement facilities, were sufficient to meet the tar-
get. How to stimulate firms to shift from adopting end-of-pipe treatment technology
(light green) to innovations (bright green) still needs further investigation.
After verifying the positive effect of environmental regulations on firms’ pollution re-
duction, especially for those in heavily polluted industries, we turn to examine their eco-
nomic impacts on firms. Significantly reduced pollution, output, and pollution per unit
are believed to influence firms’ economic performance. To this end, we conduct a test to
further assess the impact of environmental regulations on firms’ economic performance
including profits, capital, labor and market share. The empirical results show that these
four indicators, without exception, decrease across all industries. Also, for firms belong-
ing to heavily polluting industries located in cities with more stringent environmental
regulations, their profits, capital, labor and market share decline more compared with
their counterparts in less-polluting industries located in cities with weaker regulations.
A decrease in output, input and market share of firms might shed light on potential ad-
justment of firm relocation. To provide more evidence on somewhat "internal" variant of
the pollution havens hypothesis, we therefore further testify the impact of environmental
regulation on firm entry.
There already exists an extensive literature on the effects of environmental regula-
tions on emissions reduction in manufacturing activity and environmental quality im-
provement (Nelson, Tietenberg and Donihue, 1993; Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Green-
stone and Hanna, 2014).3 Researchers are also curious about mechanisms underlying
regulation-induced environmental cleanup. As Levinson (2009), we prove that the tech-
nique effect plays the predominant role in environmental improvement. The way how
3Despite the emerging but still limited research using firm-level pollution data (Martin, 2011; Zhang,
Chen and Guo, 2018), most studies rely on macro-level data. We add to the former literature by using
comprehensive firm-level pollution and economic data to provide micro-level evidence on whether and to
what extent changes in regulatory stringency have contributed to not only firms’ emissions reductions but
also their economic loss. More importantly, by integrating industrial variance in pollution intensity, we also
find notable cross-industry heterogeneity in firms’ environmental performance.
5
technology matters is closely related to the literature on environment-friendly innovation
(such as green patents) induced by environmental protection. Some of the researchers
find positive effects (Acemoglu, Akcigit, Hanley and Kerr, 2016; Aghion, Dechezleprêtre,
Hemous, Martin and Van Reenen, 2016; Gutiérrez and Teshima, 2018; Aghion, Bénabou,
Martin and Roulet, 2019), while some others find negative ones (Nelson, Tietenberg and
Donihue, 1993; Gray and Shadbegian, 1998; Gans, 2012). As Gutiérrez and Teshima (2018)
theoretically proves that tighter climate policy including emissions caps does not neces-
sarily improve innovations, we also find little evidence on firms’ green patent applica-
tions in reaction to stringent environmental regulations. Instead, in response to stricter
emission reduction regulation, firms are more prone to adopt other environment-friendly
technologies, such as abatement facilities to reduce COD level in effluent, freshwater sav-
ing, and wastewater recycling technologies.
This research is also linked to the literature on the effect of environmental regulations
on the microeconomic activities of regulated firms and industries, on their employment
(Henderson, 1996; Greenstone, 2002; Walker, 2013), firm productivity (Berman and Bui,
2001; Greenstone, List and Syverson, 2012), industrial location (Henderson, 1996; Becker
and Henderson, 2000; Chen, Kahn, Liu and Wang, 2018), trade-environment links (Gutiér-
rez and Teshima, 2018), and on export and foreign direct investment (Keller and Levinson,
2002; Cai, Lu, Wu and Yu, 2016; Shi and Xu, 2018), among others. Our paper is also re-
lated to studies executing decomposition of change of emissions reductions that can be
explained by various effects (Levinson, 2009; Martin, 2011; Shapiro and Walker, 2018).
We complement the literature by not only implementing intra-industry decomposition
to find out the contribution of manufacturing scale, composition of industries and tech-
nology, but also decomposing within-firm behaviors to more clearly portray the role of
within-firm scale effect and within-firm technique effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses relevant institutional
background and presents stylized facts based on preliminary data analysis. Section 3
provides the main empirical specification and describes the data. The main empirical
results are presented in Section 4, followed by a discussion on the mechanism underlying
the effect of environmental regulations in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss firms’ other
economic performance upon stricter environmental regulations. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Institutional Background and Stylized Facts
2.1 Institutional Background
Among all the regulatory tools for emissions reductions, concentration controls and emis-
sions target controls are two of the fundamental ones. The former one aims to require pol-
lution sources (e.g., industrial facilities) to control for concentrations of contaminants to
comply with national pollution control standards, while the latter sets compulsory emis-
sions caps as well as reduction targets of regulated pollutants. These two tools coexist
in Chinese environmental regulations, since the nationwide adoption of emissions target
controls from the 9th Five-Year Plan between 1996 and 2000. To account for invalidity of
concentration control in limiting total scale of pollutants entering environment, emissions
target controls in China mainly focus on "critical pollutants" by setting national reduction
targets followed by top-down subdivision from the central government to provinces then
to cities.
Unfortunately, the emissions reduction goal wasn’t accomplished during the 9th Five-
Year Plan period or in the term that followed. Among all the targeting indicators set up
in the 10th Five-Year Plan, pollution control targets were the only ones unachieved. COD
emissions in 2005 were only 2% lower than that of the baseline year 2000. To reverse
the failure in accomplishing the emissions control targets, the government substantively
strengthened the emissions target control scheme in the 11th Five-Year Plan period from
2006 to 2010. After decomposing the national goal to provinces, the goal statements on
emissions reductions were accordingly signed between each provincial government and
the national Ministry of Environmental Protection. The performance of government offi-
cers in fulfilling their duties relating to the emissions mandates, according to Measures on
Accomplishment Evaluation of Critical Pollutants Emissions Control Target, were evalu-
ated and incorporated into their competency assessment, with potential impacts on their
accountability and promotion. Moreover, other complementary regulations, such as Sta-
tistical Measures on Critical Pollutants Emissions Control Target and Interim Verifying
Measures on Critical Pollutants Emissions Control Target, were enacted in 2006. As a
result, the 10% reduction target of two "critical pollutants"—COD and SO2—lower than
2005 level was exceeded achieved.4 We therefore infer that the 11th Five-Year Plan period
was the turning point pertaining to the effectiveness of emissions target controls.
4The scope of critical pollutants in each five-year plan varied. The 9th Five-Year Plan defined 12 pollu-
tants as "critical pollutants." The scope was narrowed into 6 pollutants during the 10th Five-Year Plan. COD
and SO2 were the only two focuses of the 11th Five-Year Plan.
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2.2 Stylized Facts
As the core of emissions control target, provinces were assigned with different emissions
reduction targets within the 11th Five-Year Plan. For instance, Guangdong with the high-
est target is obliged to reduce 0.159 million tons of COD during 2006 and 2010, while
Xizang, Qinghai, and Xinjiang at the bottom have no target for COD emissions control.
With such differing mandatory targets, there prevails a wide discrepancy in the strin-
gency of environmental regulation across provinces. Bearing in mind these regional vari-
ations in legal enforcement, we plot COD emissions changes for firms located in different
provinces, to provide a hint on whether COD emissions levels are associated with strin-
gency of environmental regulations. Provinces are accordingly divided into two groups—
tightly regulated and loosely regulated provinces—based on whether their COD reduc-
tion targets is above or below the median target mandated in the 11th Five-Year Plan. We
sum the volume of firms’ COD emissions in each group, and Figure 2 presents the results.
The blue line, associated with the left y-axis, plots the overall COD emissions of tightly
regulated provinces, whereas the red dashed line corresponding to the right y-axis is in-
dicative of COD emissions of the loosely regulated group. It is interesting to note that,
according to Figure 2, COD emissions in tightly regulated provinces decreased, plunge
sharply from 2007, reaching a historically low level in 2010. COD emissions in loosely
regulated provinces, quite on the contrary, remained largely stable with slight decline
between 2005 and 2010. We summarize the first stylized fact as follows:
Stylized fact 1. In response to different environmental regulation stringency, firms in tightly
regulated regions reduce more pollutants than those in loosely regulated regions.
To further explore whether the effect of environmental regulation stringency on firms’
pollution reduction depends on pollution intensity difference across industries, we take
industrial pollution intensity into consideration. After all, heavily polluting industries
contribute most of the pollutants and are often viewed as the main sources of emissions
reduction. Apart from separating highly and loosely regulated provinces, we divide all
30 manufacturing industries at CIC-2 (Chinese Industry Classification) level into heavily
polluting industries and lightly polluting industries depending on whether their pollu-
tion intensity is above or below the median level of all manufacturing industries. As
demonstrated by the graph at the top of Figure 3, no matter whether they are located
in tightly or loosely regulated provinces, firms belonging to heavily polluting industries
both experience declines in COD emissions. The graph at the bottom which plots changes
in firms’ COD emissions in lightly polluting industries, however, shows that COD emis-
sions of firms located in tightly regulated provinces, surprisingly, increases (the blue-
dotted line) during the 11th Five-Year Plan period. Thus, we come to the second stylized
8
Figure 2: COD Emissions in Manufacturing in Tightly and Loosely Regulated Provinces
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fact:
Stylized fact 2. The effect of environmental regulation stringency on firms’ COD emissions
varied across industries with different polluting intensity. Industrial polluting intensity positively
reinforces the effect of environmental regulation stringency on firms’ pollution reduction.
2.3 A Statistical Decomposition of China’s COD Emissions, 2001–2010
Probing for the cause of COD emissions change in a much broader spectrum, we, in this
subsection, decompose changes in total manufacturing COD emissions into changes that
can be explained by total scale of manufacturing output, the composition of products pro-
duced, and the pollution intensity of a given set of products following Levinson (2009).
Total pollution P from manufacturing, equals to sum of pollution from each industry ps,
which can be further written as sum of output of each industry, ys multiplied by es, that
is pollution intensity of that industry denoted by amount of pollution per unit of output
value. Alternatively, we can also write manufacturing pollution as equal to total output
Y times each industry’s share of total output (vs = ys/Y), multiplied by es. The equation
is as follows:
P =∑
s
ps =∑
s
yses = Y∑
s
vses. (1)
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Figure 3: COD Emissions in Manufacturing with Different Pollution Intensities in
Tightly and Loosely Regulated Provinces
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In vector notation, we have
P = Yv′e, (2)
where v′ and e are vectors representing market share of each of the n industries and their
pollution intensity, respectively.
Differentiating Equation 2 totally, we obtain
dP = v′edY + Yedv′ + Yv′de. (3)
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation 3 is the scale effect, indicating changes
of total pollution that can be explained by increase of overall scale of manufacturing,
holding the composition of industries and industrial pollution intensity fixed. The sec-
ond term is composition effect, revealing the change of industries mix, holding manufac-
turing scale and industrial pollution intensity fixed. The third term is technique effect,
which accounts for changes in pollution intensities of each industry, holding scale and
composition unchanged.
Figure 4 illustrate the resulting statistical decomposition for COD emissions in China.
The top red solid line depicts COD emissions that would have occured if the market
share of each industries and its pollution intensity had remained fixed at 2001 level but
the overall manufacturing output had equalled obeserved historical values. The middle
blue dashed line in Figure 4 plots the change of COD emissions if we keep the amount
of pollution per unit of output value, that is the pollution intensity of each industry as
in 2001 level, but the overall manufacturing output and market share of each industry
equal to its obeserved historical values. It reflects the comprehensive impact of overall
manufacturing scale and composition of industries on COD emissions. The bottom green
dashed line plots actual COD emissions from manufacturing, explaining the overall im-
pact from manufacturing scale, composition of industries and technology.
Figure 4 carries rich information on the driving force of firms’ COD emissions. First,
the gap between the red solid line and the blue dashed line shows the change of COD
emissions that can be explained by the change in composition of industries in manu-
facturing. The increased gap between the two provide clear evidence that composition
between manufacturing products that require high and low amounts of pollution emis-
sions for production has changed over time. The change, implicit though it is, shows the
reduction of dirtier industries but the expansion of cleaner industries in Chinese manufac-
turing. Second, the gap between the blue-dashed line and green-dashed line shows how
much a decline in pollution intensity at industrial level is accounted for COD emissions
11
reduction from manufacturing in China. Combined with the gap between the solid-red
line and the blue-dashed line, we can conclude that around 18.97% of COD emissions
change can be explained by "composition effect," whereas the "technique effect" accounts
for 82.03% of COD emissions change. Thus, our third stylized fact is as follows.
Stylized Fact 3. "Composition effect" (adjustment of market share of each industry) and "tech-
nique effect" (lowered pollution intensity brought by technological progress) are both responsible
for a decline of COD emissions from Chinese manufacturing upon stricter environmental regula-
tions. The environmental improvement is, however, mostly brought about by "technique effect".
Figure 4: Decomposition of the Three Main Effects Causing COD Emissions in Chinese
Manufacturing
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3 Empirical Specification and Data Description
3.1 Empirical Specification
The three previous stylized facts provide intuitive evidence that strengthening emissions
reduction control enforcement and greater controls on industrial pollution intensity have
positive effects on firms’ pollution control. The large variation in regulatory stringency
among cities due to the disparate emissions control targets set from central to local gov-
ernment is useful in helping identify the causal effects between environmental regula-
tions and firms’ responses, and how it varied across industries. We therefore adopt a
DID strategy facilitated by a mandatory COD emissions reduction target scheme that
12
were substantively strengthened by the 11th Five-Year Plan from 2006. Given the poten-
tial legal liabilities and the enhanced accountability to government, cities assigned with
high reduction targets have accordingly shifted into a stricter environmental regulation
pattern. We compare firms’ pollution in cities with more stringent environmental reg-
ulations before and after 2006 with the equivalent changes in cities with less stringent
environmental regulations based on the following specification:
yit = β1Rc × Postt + γZc,t−1 + ϕi + ϕt + eit, (4)
where the dependent variable, yit, refers to firm i’s pollution-related activities, including
log value of COD, output, and pollution intensity at year t.5 Rc is a measure of environ-
mental regulation stringency denoted by the total COD reduction target mandated by the
11th Five-Year Plan for city c from 2006 to 2010. Postt is a dummy variable equals to 0
for all years before 2006, and to 1 from 2006 and onward. Zc,t−1is a vector of city-level
characteristics including log gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and log population
at year t− 1. ϕi is firm fixed effects accounting for unobserved time-invariant differences
across firms that may affect firms’ polluting activities. In other words, we focus on the
within-firm variation arising from changes in environmental regulation stringency faced
by the firm. ϕt is year fixed effects capturing common economic factors affecting all the
cities. eit is the standard errors clustered at city level capturing all unobserved factors that
influence yit.
Intangible though it is, environmental regulation stringency could reasonably be prox-
ied by the differing COD emissions reduction targets mandated by the 11th Five-Year
Plan. Considering that open-accessed official documents only provide emissions reduc-
tion targets at provincial level, we follow Chen, Kahn, Liu and Wang (2018) to construct
emissions reduction targets at the city level, that is, Rc, in Equation 4, as follows:
∆CODc,05−10 = ∆CODp,05−10 ×
39
∑
i=1
ui
output value of industry i in city c
output value of industry i in province p
, (5)
where ∆CODc,05−10 is COD emissions reduction targets in the 11th Five-Year commitment
period for city c. The second term on the right-hand side of the equation is a measure of a
city’s proportion to its province’s total output value across all the 39 two-digit industries,
weighted by each industry’s proportion of COD emissions to total COD emissions from
5Firms could possibly respond to stricter mandated emissions targets by producing less or lowering
the pollution intensity of emissions per output through, for example, using less polluting input, recycling
usage of inputs, adopting pollution abatement devices or green innovation.
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manufacturers, ui.6 Even though a city’s emissions target could also be measured by pro-
portion of a city’s actual COD emissions that accounts for total emissions of its province,
we still use the strategy denoted by Equation 5 in our main empirical analyses due to
endogeneity concerns. However, as a robustness test, we rely on the other measurement
of Rc specified as follows,
∆CODc,05−10 = ∆CODp,05−10 × Pc,2005
∑Jj=1 Pj,2005
(6)
where the second term on the right-hand side of the equation is a measure of the city’s
proportion of the province’s total emissions volume in 2005 based on firm-level emissions
data provided by AESPF. Table A3 in the appendix presents the results. Figure 5 provides
a map of China in which we depict the level of Rc of all 285 cities in our sample. The
darker the color is, the higher the emissions reduction targets are and the stricter the
environmental regulations and legal enforcement.
There are large variations in pollution intensity across industries of China’s manu-
facturing. Extreme examples are paper production (CIC code 22) as the most heavily
polluting industry responsible for 35.16% of the total COD emissions and recycling and
manufacturing of articles for cultural, educational, and sporting activities (CIC code 43
and 24) as the least polluted industry accounting for only 0.013% of the total COD emis-
sions. Along with the compulsory targets, industries such as paper production, textiles,
chemical materials and products, beverage production are identified as "key" target in-
dustries for lowering pollution in China’s 11th Five-Year Plan. The response of firms in
industries with discrete pollution intensity to stricter environmental regulations is not
necessarily the same considering different enforcement pressures that might be exerted.
To investigate the varied reaction of firms across industries with different pollution
intensity to stricter environmental regulations before and after 2006, we further run a
difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) regression based on the following model:
yit = β1Rc × Postt + β2Rc × Postt ×Dirtys + β3Dirtys × Postt + γZc,t−1 + ϕi + ϕt + eit,
(7)
where yit is the log value of firm i’s COD, output and pollution intensity at year t, re-
spectively. In Equation 7, we incorporate a variable Dirtys, that is industry’s polluting
6During the commitment period of the 11th Five-Year Plan, COD emissions reduction targets in five
cities—Dalian in Liaoning Province, Ningbo in Zhejiang Province, Xiamen in Fujian Province, Qing-
dao in Shandong Province and Shenzhen in Guangdong Province—are separately listed paralleling to 30
provinces in Mainland China (Xizang is excluded, because it is uncovered by AESPF). We directly use the
targets for these five cities in our analysis.
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Figure 5: City-Level Regulation Stringency of COD (10 Thousand Tons)
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intensity indicated by each industry’s proportion of total COD emissions in all industries
in 2005. Table A2 in the appendix reports the summary statistics of pollution intensity
for all 2-digit manufacturing industries. Definition of other variables assembles those in
equation (1). We are interested in co-efficient β2, which estimated the heterogeneous ef-
fects of environmental regulations on firms’ pollution activities across highly polluting
industries and cleaner industries. Facilitated by this, we are able to grasp the differential
effect of environmental regulation stringency on firms’ polluting and economic activities
across industries with varied polluting levels.
As well as the impact of environmental regulations on firms’ environmental perfor-
mances, we are also interested in how firms react to strengthening environmental en-
forcement, and more importantly, in the underlying forces driving firms to adjust their
environmental and economic performance. To achieve these aims, we firstly re-define
our estimated coefficient yit as the legal punishment firms faced, their effluent, water
consumption, adoption of pollution control devices, and application for green patents to
observe the role of government’s enhanced legal enforcement on firms’ recycling prac-
tice, pollution abatement facilities, and technological progress. We then replace firm i’s
pollution-related activities with economic indicators including its profits, capital, and la-
bor, as denoted by yit. Accordingly, we rely on firms’ pollution data and other firm-level
data.
3.2 Data Description
3.2.1 Firms’ Pollution Data
The data on firms’ pollution emissions come from Annual Environmental Survey of Pol-
luting Firms (AESPF) of China.7 Established by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment
(formerly known as the Ministry of Environmental Protection) in the 1980s in a bid to doc-
ument the state of environmental pollution and abatement in China, AESPF covers rich
information on firms’ environmenal performance, including emissions of main pollutants
(industrial effluent, waste air, COD, NH3, NOx, SO2, smoke and dust, solid waste, noise,
etc.), pollution abatement equipment, and energy consumption (usage of freshwater, re-
cycle water, coal, fuel, clean gas, etc.), among others. Even though gradually normalized
during the past 40 years, the scope, frequency, main indicators and reporting method of
the environmental survey become largely stable from the starting year of the 10th Five-
7Because of the lack of an official name, the dataset was also named the China Environmental Statistics
dataset (CESD) (Zhang, Chen and Guo, 2018), Environmental Statistics Data (ESD) (Wu, Guo, Zhang and
Bu, 2017), or the Environmental Survey and Reporting Database (ESRD) (He, Wang and Zhang, 2018).
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Year Plan in 2001. For example, a firm is surveyed when one of its pollutants fall into
the top 85% of the total emissions volume of that pollutant at county level.8 Those firms
are included in a key-point environmental survey list. Once listed, they are obliged to
complete uniform statistical statements sent by the environmental authorities to report a
wide range of environmental information in the last year. Scrutinized and verified by all
upper levels of administrative authorities, the data will be confirmed and included in the
database.
Like the broadly used Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) which provides the
basis for macro economy indicators, AESPF is also the sourcing database for calculating
macro-level environmental indicators in, for example, China Statistical Yearbook on Envi-
ronment. In Figure 6, we compare the COD emissions volume/industrial effluent aggre-
gated by firm-level data from AESPF and the total volume of industrial COD/industrial
effluent from China Statistical Yearbook on Environment. The coincidence between the
blue/red dotted line and the 100% level provides us with more confidence about the re-
liability of AESPF data in our empirical analysis. Figure A2 in the appendix compares
main air pollutants and pollution abatement facilities between the micro-data and the
macro-data. Similar coincidence can be found as for air pollutants and facilities.
To investigate the effect of environmental regulations pertaining to COD emissions
control in the 11th Five-Year Plan from 2006 to 2010, we mainly rely on AESPF data from
2001 to 2010. The cleaned dataset includes 437,253 observations, containing information
on 96,378 unique firms.9
3.2.2 Other Firm-Level Data
As one of the most comprehensive and widely used Chinese firm-level datasets, the An-
nual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) maintained by the National Bureau of Statistics of
China (NBSC) provides the basis for our analysis on firms’ economic performance af-
fected by environmental regulations. This data panel covers all state-owned industrial
firms and non-state-owned industrial firms with annual sales above 5 million RMB. It
contains detailed information on each of those Chinese firms, including basic informa-
tion (name, identification number, registration type, etc.) and information on a firms’
accounting statement (balance sheet, profit and loss account, and cash flow information).
8During the 9th Five-Year Plan period, industrial polluting sources covered by the survey were limited
to state-owned enterprises above the county level and township industrial plants. Even though the scope
gradually expanded during the Five-Year Plan periods after the 10th Five-Year Plan period, the basic 85%
selection principle of industrial polluting sources remains unchanged.
9When cleaning the data, we only keep information on manufacturing; we exclude firms with missing
or zero values for COD and total output in our cleaned dataset.
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Figure 6: Comparison between Micro-Data and Macro-Data on COD and Effluent
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Notes: The macro-data come from China Statistical Yearbook on Environment, and the micro-data come
from Annual Environmental Survey of Polluting Firms (AESPF) of China.
Grounded in a firms’ name, and then registration number, the merged ASIF and AESPF
data contain information for 222,780 observations from 2001 to 2009.10 As well as inves-
tigating firms’ response of production to stricter pollution abatement requirements, we
also use the merged dataset to construct robustness checks.
In an effort to find out the innovative effect of stricter environmental regulation, the
green patent data we use comes from the Chinese Patent Dataset, maintained by the
China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA). The dataset records de-
tailed information on each patent applied for through CNIPA since 1985, including year,
name of the applicants, description of the patent, etc.11 Firms’ performance in green tech-
nology induced by stricter environmental regulations is at the core of our analysis. We,
therefore, follow the IPC classification of environmental-related technologies in Hašcˇicˇ
and Migotto (2015) to identify all the green patents, or more precisely innovation patents
and utility models aimed to reduce pollution emissions during production, from the
10Although the AESPF data we used are from 2001 to 2010, ASIF data from 2010 include some misre-
ported information and have been generally abandoned by researchers, such as Fan, Lin and Tang (2018)
and König, Storesletten, Song and Zilibotti (2018). Therefore, the duration of time in the merged dataset is
from 2001 to 2009.
11Patent data in China include three categories: invention patents, utility models, and designs. We ex-
clude the third category, "designs", from our patent data, because the common view is that designs lack
relevant information about technological innovation.
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patent dataset of CNIPA. We further identify firms’ green patents specifically on water
pollution abatement based on the comparison table in Hašcˇicˇ and Migotto (2015). Recog-
nizing that the number of firms owning green patents is limited, patent-related variables
are measured by the logarithm of 1 plus the initial number of firms’ green patents. We
merge the patent data with AESPF on the ground of firms’ names.
Where they contravene the law, firms might be given warnings, fines, compliance
orders, or some combination thereof by the government to enforce compliance with reg-
ulatory legislation. To construct measures on legal enforcement, we use data on environ-
mental administrative penalties, collected by the Institute of Public and Environmental
Affairs (IPEA), a well-known Chinese environmental NGO. Administrative authorities
are obliged to disclose information on environmental penalties they levy on firms, per-
sons or other organizations through many channels including the internet. The database
provides detailed information, from 2004 onwards, on environmental penalties, includ-
ing illegal facts, types of penalties, the amount of monetary fines, and data on the imple-
mentation of the penalties, faced by firms because of their illegal polluting activities. We
merge the environmental penalty data from 2004 to 2010 with the AESPF data based on
firms’ names in our Section 5.
In order to see whether firms will relocate to jurisdictions with less stringent envi-
ronmental regulations, we utilize the State Administration of Industry and Commerce
(SAIC) database in China. The SAIC provides complete records of name and domicile
of firms, their representatives, registered capital, business scope, shareholders, and what
concern us most, their establishment year. Therefore, we are able to trace firm’s entrancce
in different cities by adding the number of firms firstly established at city level.
We also take advantage of various statistical books, such as the China City Statistical
Yearbook and the China Statistical Yearbook on Environment, and many official docu-
ments, for instance, Approval of National Emissions Control Targets of Main Pollutants
during the 11th Five-Year Plan by the State Council, to obtain the city-level data and in-
dustrial COD emissions as well as emissions reduction targets. Table A1 in the appendix
reports summary statistics for all the variables.
4 Main Results
4.1 Baseline Results
To more precisely capture the underlying forces that drive firms’ environmental perfor-
mance in response to more stringent environmental regulations, we follow Martin (2011)
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to decompose the within-firm sample as follows:
ei,t = yi,t × ei,tyi,t (8)
ei,t is firm i’s total pollution at year t, which equals to firms’ output yi,t multiplied by
pollution per unit of output ei,t/yi,t. Taking the log of both sides of equation 8, we have:
∆log(ei,t) = ∆log(yi,t) + ∆log(
ei,t
yi,t
) (9)
where ∆log(ei,t) refers to changes in firm i’s total COD emissions at year t. The first
term on the right-hand side of Equation 9 is the "within-firm scale effect", which explains
changes of total pollution as firms’ overall output increase or decrease. The second term
is "within-firm technique effect", accounting for pollution changes brought by changes in
firm level pollution intensity, through, for instance, adoption of pollution abatement fa-
cilities, introduction of cleaner production process, and recycling usage of inputs, among
others. We can find that changes of the total emissions can be explained by a within-firm
"scale effect" and a "technique effect". The finer within-firm disaggregation is, the more
likely we could accurately evaluate the role of different underlying forces in abating water
pollution.
Table 1 presents the estimation results of Equation 4. All columns include firm fixed
effects and year fixed effects. We control for log GDP per capita and log population in
all odd columns rather than the odd columns. Columns (1) and (2) present the estimated
coefficient for COD; Columns (3) and (4) are the results for output; while the last two
columns indicate the results for firms’ pollution intensity, that is, COD/output. In Col-
umn (1), the estimated coefficient is -0.063, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
This finding suggests that, with the advent of stricter environmental regulations, manu-
facturing in China is becoming cleaner overall. The extent of emissions reduction, how-
ever, varies for cities faced with different environmental regulation stringency denoted
by mandatory COD emissions targets set in the 11th five-year plan period starting from
2006. Compared with cities with lenient environmental regulations, cities with tight reg-
ulation account for larger pollution reductions. Taking Shanghai and Kunming in Yunan
Province as an example, the former ranks first in Rc, that is COD emissions reduction (45
thousand tons) among all large cities, whereas the latter ranks bottom among all large
cities in COD emissions reduction target (4.2 thousand tons). Taking Column (2) as our
preferred baseline result, in response to stricter emissions control under 11th Five-year
Plan, the extent of the COD emissions fall in Shanghai is nearly 30% larger than that in
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Kunming.12
An important assumption of our DID identification strategy is that the different over-
time changes in pollution activities across firms at cities with different levels of environ-
mental regulation stringency are solely caused by the laying out of reduction targets set
in the 11th Five-Year Plan, rather than by any pre-existing differential time trends across
firms. To test this assumption, we replace the interaction between environmental regula-
tion stringency and the post dummy in Equation 4 with the sum of the interaction terms
between environmental regulation stringency and all the year dummies. Figure A1 in the
appendix plots the estimated yearly effects of environmental regulation stringency Rc on
firms’ COD emissions. We observe no significant pre-trend before 2005 but a break in
2005.
When looking at Columns (4) and (6) of Table 1, we perceive that, among 7.3% of
the variation in pollution reduction across cities with different environmental regulation
stringency after 2006, 2.2% of them can be explained by within-firm "scale effect", that
is, a drop in firms’ total output, whereas 5.1% of those can be explained by within-firm
"technique effect", including but not limited to the adoption of pollution abatement facili-
ties, the introduction of cleaner production processes and recycling inputs. A back-of-the-
envelope calculation reveals that, within-firm "technique effect" is the predominant deter-
minant, contributing up to 70% (-0.051/-0.073) to the effect of environmental regulation
stringency on firms’ pollution reduction, whereas the within-firm "scale effect" accounts
for the other 30% (-0.022/-0.073).13 Our benchmark results imply that, when stringent
environmental regulations comes into force, firms located in cities with more stringent
environmental regulations are stimulated to reduce more pollutants largely through tech-
nological progress, compared with their counterparts in cities with lenient environmental
regulations. In addition, Table A3 in the appendix shows that our baseline results are
robust to alternative methods of calculating environmental regulation stringency.
We further test the impact of environmental regulation stringency on other pollutants
in Table 2. All columns include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. We control for
log GDP per capita and log population in all even columns rather than the odd columns.
First, we execute a test for the effect of environmental regulation stringency on firms’ SO2
emissions, another one of the two pollutants regulated by top-down mandatory reduc-
12The discrepancy in the percentage of emissions reduction between these two cities brought on by
stricter emissions control from 2006 is calculated as −0.073 ∗ (45− 4.2) = −0.29784.
13It is noteworthy that the weight of the "technique effect" in accounting for overall changes in manufac-
turing emissions in our cross-industry decomposition in 2.3 is larger than it is here. This finding implies
that, from the viewpoint of individual firms, adjustments in output will be an easier way to trade off be-
tween an output of production and costs in meeting stricter emissions control requirements. From the
viewpoint of industries, however, shifts among industries happen more.
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Table 1: Baseline Results
COD Output CODOutput
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rc × Postt -0.063*** -0.073*** -0.021* -0.022* -0.043* -0.051**
(0.022) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.025) (0.021)
Log GDP per capita 0.386 0.042 0.345
(0.305) (0.064) (0.349)
Log Population -0.099 0.043 -0.142
(0.116) (0.058) (0.131)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253
Adj R-Square 0.800 0.801 0.885 0.885 0.782 0.782
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the
city level are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are logarithmic.
tion targets in the 11th Five-Year Plan. In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2, we also find
that, upon the advent of the pollution reduction commitment period from 2006, firms’
SO2 emissions decrease, and the negative effect with similar magnitude with those in the
baseline is, more notably, declared for cities with more stringent environmental regula-
tions. Second, we study the effects of environmental regulations on two other pollutants
NH3-N and smoke and dust before and after 2006. Since these two pollutants are not
"critical pollutants" in the 11th Five-Year Plan, the strictness in environmental regulations
should have little effect on emissions if our results in Table 1 are not driven by confound-
ing factors. In contrast, if the results were entirely driven by confounding factors, the
confounding factors should also apply to pollutants not regulated by obligatory emis-
sions reduction targets. As can be told from Columns (3) to (6), we do not find emissions
of NH3-N and smoke and dust to be significantly affected by environmental regulation
stringency. Therefore, Columns (3) to (6), which provide a placebo test, rule out strong
confounding factors as being responsible for the relationship between environmental reg-
ulation stringency and pollution emissions.
4.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Industry
As our third stylized fact in Section 2.2 reveals, the effect of environmental regulation
stringency on firms’ COD emissions varied across industries with different polluting in-
tensity. Industrial polluting intensity may positively reinforce the effect of environmental
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Table 2: Other Pollutant Results
SO2 NH3-N Smoke and Dust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rc × Postt -0.103*** -0.099*** 0.013 0.014 -0.002 -0.008
(0.028) (0.028) (0.040) (0.041) (0.045) (0.042)
City-level Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 301,439 301,439 232,430 232,430 169,432 169,432
Adj R-Square 0.818 0.818 0.777 0.777 0.842 0.842
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the
city level are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are logarithmic.
City-level controls include log per capita city GDP and log city population.
regulation stringency on firms’ pollution reduction. To test the heterogeneous effect, we
estimate Equation 7, and Table 3 presents the results.
In Table 3, the dependent variables are COD (see Columns (1) and (2)), output (see
Columns (3) and (4)) and firms’ pollution intensity (see Columns (5) and (6)), respec-
tively. We control for firm fixed effect and year fixed effect in all columns. By adding
city-level variables in Columns (2), (4), and (6), the results are not substantively differ-
ent from those in the odd columns. Combining the estimates of Rc × Postt × Dirtys as
well as Rc × Postt which are both negative in all columns, we find that, firms’ pollution
emissions decrease in all industries. The extent of emissions reduction, however, varies
across industries. Firms that belong to heavily polluting industries located in cities with
more stringent environmental regulations cut down much more on pollutant use after
2006, compared with their intra-city counterparts in less-polluting industries. Here is a
back-of-the-envelope calculation on the base of Column (2). Let’s take the two noticeable
industries—manufacturing of paper and paper products and manufacturing of articles
for cultural, educational, and sporting activities—in Shanghai and Kunming again as ex-
amples.14 Compared with paper industry firms in Kunming, firms in the same industry
in Shanghai reduced 69.4% more COD emissions in response to stronger emissions reduc-
tion enforcement ((-0.339×0.35164-0.051)×(4.5-0.42)=-0.694). Firms in the latter industry
in Shanghai reduce, however, only 20.8% more COD in relation to their counterparts in
Kunming ((-0.339×0.00013-0.051)×(4.5-0.42)=-0.208). The greater sensibility of firms in
14Among all two-digit industries, the paper and paper products industry reports the highest pollution
intensity with a Dirtys of 0.35164, whereas the manufacturing of articles for culture, education, and sport
activities has the smallest industrial pollution intensity at 0.00013.
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heavily polluting industries to environmental regulations after 2006 lends solid evidence
to our stylized facts about the inter-industry allocation.
As a robustness check, we further use a dummy variable to measure industrial pol-
lution intensity. The variable equals to one for heavily polluting industries, and equals
to zero for lightly polluting industries. As shown in Table A4, the results remain simi-
lar. We also conduct robustness checks by using information on above-scale firms from
ASIF data. Our results are robust to the sample adjustment, as shown in Table A6 in the
appendix.
Table 3: Heterogeneous Results
COD Output CODOutput
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rc × Postt ×Dirtys -0.343*** -0.339*** -0.133* -0.136* -0.210* -0.203*
(0.123) (0.130) (0.072) (0.073) (0.120) (0.123)
Rc × Postt -0.041* -0.051** -0.010 -0.012 -0.031 -0.039*
(0.025) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.026) (0.020)
Postt ×Dirtys 0.280 0.288 0.525*** 0.531*** -0.245 -0.243
(0.183) (0.187) (0.098) (0.098) (0.187) (0.191)
City-level Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253
Adj R-Square 0.800 0.801 0.885 0.885 0.782 0.782
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the
city level are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are logarithmic.
City-level controls include log per capita city GDP and log city population.
5 Mechanism
Manufacturers in China are "greening", as observed in the previous analysis. It thus be-
comes natural to ask: which inherent mechanisms play a role when firms adapt to a new
era of stringent environmental regulation? When answering this question, it is necessary
to examine activities at firm level. With various firm-level data, we are able to execute a
broad spectrum of tests on roles of recycling practice (recycling of wastewater), adoption
of pollution abatement facilities (wastewater treatment), and firms’ technology progress
(green patents), among others.
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5.1 Environmental Penalties
Despite the fact that targets assigned to each level of government and polluters are oblig-
atory, the effectiveness of target control heavily relies on the strength of daily legal en-
forcement, such as environmental penalties levied by authorities on firms, which is also
the most frequently used regulatory tool in China. As an important prerequisite, we need
to be sure that legal enforcement on emissions target control has been tightened, which
could be explained by changes in the probability that firms might be punished before and
after 2006.
To do so, we construct two variables, Polluter Penalty Dum and Polluter Penalty Num.
The former one is a dummy variable denoting whether a firm was punished for violations
of emissions limitations and other legal obligations. To be specific, Polluter Penalty Dum
equals to 1 in the year when the firm was penalized and otherwise equals 0. The latter
one, nevertheless, refers to frequency with which the firm was penalized in a certain
year. Polluter Penalty Num was numerated with the sequence of 1,2,3...according to the
number of times the firm was punished.
As shown in Table 4, after the start of the 11th Five-Year Plan in 2006, the strength-
ened environmental regulations significantly increased the probability firms might be
punished. The increased probability is much more notable for firms located in cities with
stricter environmental regulations and in industries with higher pollution intensity.
Table 4: Polluter Penalty Results
Polluter Penalty Dum Polluter Penalty Num
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rc × Postt 0.016** 0.013* 0.016** 0.013*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Rc × Postt ×Dirtys 0.048*** 0.049***
(0.017) (0.018)
Postt ×Dirtys 0.083*** 0.097***
(0.029) (0.030)
City-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253
Adj R-Square 0.124 0.124 0.119 0.120
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors
clustered at the city level are reported in parentheses. City-level
controls include log per capita city GDP and log city population.
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5.2 Further Decomposing Within-Firm Pollution Activities
First, we execute a finer within-firm decomposition based on Section 4.1 by introducing
another pollutant—effluent. Effluent is an important water pollution parameter, because
it not only reflects the total volume of industrial water entering into the natural environ-
ment, but also provides us means by which we may assess the real determinants of firms’
environmental performance. Therefore, firms’ effluent discharge can be further decom-
posed into
∆log( fi,t) = ∆log(yi,t) + ∆log(
fi,t
yi,t
), (10)
where ∆log( fi,t) is change of effluent discharge of firm i at year t. Changes in firms’ output
is expressed by ∆log(yi,t). The second term on the right-hand side of the equation refers
to changes of firm i’s pollution intensity, that is effluent discharge per unit of output.
We repeat the regression of our preferred baseline specification and the triple interac-
tion with industrial polluting intensity for each of above two components. Columns (1)
and (2) of Table 5 present the results for firms’ effluent discharge. Columns (3) and (4) re-
port the results for firms’ pollution intensities. In all columns, we add city-level controls,
firm fixed effect, and year fixed effect. As shown in Column (1) of Table 5, the coeffi-
cient on firms’ effluent is negative and statistically significant, which implies that firms’
discharge of effluent declines adhering to similar patterns as COD emissions after 2006.
In other words, the extent of effluent discharge is negatively associated with stringency
of environmental regulations. After including the triple interaction, the point estimates
of Rc × Postt and Rc × Postt × Dirtys in Column (2) are both negative. It indicates that
firms’ effluent declines in all industries after strengthening the environmental regulations
on target pollution reduction in 2006. The effect is, however, much stronger for heavily
polluting industries. We find similar effects on firms’ effluent discharge per unit of out-
put as shown in Columns (3) and (4). That is to say, decreased industrial wastewater
discharge (effluent) is the main reason for firms’ emissions reduction.
5.3 Water-Related Energy Consumption
We now turn to examine the adjustment of firms’ total water consumption (industrial
water) and freshwater consumption (freshwater) per unit of output affected by environ-
mental regulations. Recycling use of industrial water is a feasible approach to "kill two
birds with one stone" with lower costs for firms to save energy while also reducing pol-
lution emissions. We thus expect that the beneficial effect of environmental regulations
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Table 5: Effluent Results
Effluent EffluentOutput
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rc × Postt -0.059*** -0.027 -0.035** -0.013
(0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Rc × Postt ×Dirtys -0.471** -0.348*
(0.191) (0.207)
Postt ×Dirtys 0.847*** 0.325*
(0.174) (0.190)
City-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 435,555 435,555 427,583 427,583
Adj R-Square 0.852 0.852 0.799 0.799
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard er-
rors clustered at the city level are reported in parentheses. All
dependent variables are logarithmic. City-level controls include
log per capita city GDP and log city population.
on firms’ emissions reduction through water recycle should be stronger for firms in cities
with stricter environmental regulations and those in industries with higher levels of pol-
lution intensity. The negative coefficients in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 6 prove our
speculation that, relative to cities where regulations are weaker, firms in cities where en-
vironmental regulations are more stringent consume less industrial water and freshwater
after 2006. As we can tell from Columns (2) and (4) of Table 6, for firms in more heavily
polluting industries, the decline of water consumption is much sharper, among which the
fall of freshwater consumption is especially notable.
5.4 Adoption of Pollution Control Devices
The adoption of pollution control devices refers to devices installed and operated to elim-
inate emissions of pollutants in effluent entering natural waterways. To meet mandatory
emissions caps and reduction targets on COD, firms may choose to install more pollution
control devices and to expand their treatment capabilities. We examine the effect of en-
vironmental regulation stringency on firms’ pollution abatement. Column (1) of Table 7
shows the estimation results for adoption of pollution control devices divided by firms’
volume of effluents. We find that the interaction effects between environmental regula-
tion stringency and devices per unit of effluent after 2006 is positive at 1% significant
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Table 6: Energy Results
Industrial Water
Output
Fresh Water
Output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rc × Postt -0.033** -0.023 -0.033* -0.011
(0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Rc × Postt ×Dirtys -0.150 -0.340*
(0.107) (0.192)
Postt ×Dirtys 0.189 0.297*
(0.134) (0.178)
City-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 437,123 437,123 437,090 437,090
Adj R-Square 0.808 0.808 0.797 0.797
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard er-
rors clustered at the city level are reported in parentheses. All
dependent variables are logarithmic. City-level controls include
log per capita city GDP and log city population.
level. By summing up the triple interaction among environmental regulation stringency,
post 2006 dummy, and industrial pollution intensity, we observe positive and statistically
significant results in Column (2) Table 7. The estimates on the ability of firms’ pollution
control devices per unit of effluent reveals similar positive results in Columns (3) and
(4) with those in Columns (1) and (2). After introducing stringent environmental regula-
tions in 2006, firms adopted more environmental abatement devices and expanded their
treatment capacity. The increasing use of control devices and their treatment capacity is
more notable for firms in cities with stringent environmental regulations than their coun-
terparts in cities with weaker environmental regulations after 2006. Relative to firms in
cleaner industries, firms in dirtier industries tend to be more progressive in expanding
their pollution treatment abilities.
5.5 Patents
Even though pollution abatement devices always involve technological innovation, it is
actually somewhat end-of-pipe solutions because the devices are usually purchased from
the market, and thus firms barely need to do their own R&D. In this subsection, we turn to
examine firms’ performance in terms of "bright green" induced by stricter environmental
regulations by using disaggregated firm patent data provided by National Intellectual
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Table 7: Facilities Results
Facilities
Effluent
Facility Capacity
Effluent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rc × Postt 0.067*** 0.030* 0.036** 0.022
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018)
Rc × Postt ×Dirtys 0.525*** 0.192
(0.191) (0.140)
Postt ×Dirtys -0.688*** -0.370**
(0.184) (0.164)
City-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 291,735 291,735 283,386 283,386
Adj R-Square 0.826 0.826 0.530 0.530
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard er-
rors clustered at the city level are reported in parentheses. All
dependent variables are logarithmic. City-level controls include
log per capita city GDP and log city population.
Property Administration of China.
However, we find little evidence that the severity of environmental regulations is as-
sociated with an increase in green patent and water-related green patent applications,
regardless of what industry firms belong to. The weak negative results in Columns (1)
to (4) are even indicative of the possibility that environmental regulations impede firms’
environment-related innovation. Thus, we are able to infer that emissions target con-
trols during the 11th Five-Year plan failed to stimulate firms to adopt much more effec-
tive technology to eliminate more pollutants from the production process, maybe because
other lower-cost and end-of-pipe countermeasures, such as pollution abatement facilities,
were sufficient to meet the targets. Moreover, we further divide the two variables in Ta-
ble 8 into green innovation patents, green utility models, water-related green innovation
patents, and water-related utility models according to the general classification of patents
in China. The results in Table A5 in the appendix are similar to those in Table 8.
6 Firms’ Other Economic Performance
The preceding Section 4 verifies the positive effect of environmental regulations on firms’
pollution reduction, especially for those in heavily polluted industries. The significantly
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Table 8: Green Patent Results
Green Patent Water Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rc × Postt -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Rc × Postt ×Dirtys 0.0013 -0.0005
(0.0036) (0.0024)
Postt ×Dirtys -0.0155*** 0.0007
(0.0057) (0.0035)
City-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253
Adj R-Square 0.232 0.232 0.147 0.147
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors
clustered at the city level are reported in parentheses. All depen-
dent variables are logarithmic after adding 1. City-level controls
include log per capita city GDP and log city population.
reduced pollution, output and pollution per unit are thought to influence firms’ economic
performance. To this end, we accordingly conduct a test in this section to further assess
the impact of environmental regulations on firms’ economic performance, including prof-
its, capital, labor, and market share.
Basically, Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) of Table 9 show that, with firm fixed effect, year
fixed effect and city-level variables controlled for, more severe environmental regulations
are associated with a sharp decline in firms’ profits, capital, labor and market share. The
extent of firms’ poorer economic performance, nevertheless, is different for firms located
in cities with varied environmental regulation stringency. Compared with firms in cities
with lenient environmental regulations, firms in highly regulated cities experience larger
decreases in profits, capital, labor and market share as a result of environmental regula-
tions. By incorporating the triple interaction among environmental regulation stringency,
industrial polluting intensity and post year dummy, the consistently negative estimates
of Rc × Postt and Rc × Postt × Dirtys in Columns (2), (4), (6) and (7) of Table 9 is indica-
tive of decreases in firms’ profits, capital, labor and market share in all industries. Also,
as for firms located in tightly and loosely regulated cities respectively, heavily pollut-
ing industry firms experienced much more decline in profits, capital, labor and market
share, compared with their counterparts in cleaner industry. For example, regardless of
the discrepancy in industrial polluting intensity, the average fall in firms’ profits, capital,
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labor and market share in Shanghai is 67.9%, 23.5%, 3.9% and 1.2% larger than those in
Kunming of Yunan Province, respectively; When taking into account of industrial pollu-
tion intensity, compared with firms in paper industry in Kunming, profits, capital, labor
and market share of firms in the same industry in Shanghai experienced a fall of 101.6%,
51.4%, 21% and 1.5%; firms manufacturing articles for cultural, educational, and sporting
activities, the cleanest industry when it comes to COD emissions, in Shanghai encoun-
tered a fall of only 60.2%, 17.1%, 0.2% and 1.1% in their profits, capital, labor and market
share.
Table 9: Performance Results
Profit Capital Labor Market Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rc × Postt -0.1664*** -0.1474*** -0.0577*** -0.0418*** -0.0100* -0.0004 -0.0029*** -0.0027**
(0.0222) (0.0228) (0.0094) (0.0116) (0.0051) (0.0071) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Rc × Postt ×Dirtys -0.2889** -0.2394*** -0.1450** -0.0025
(0.1173) (0.0889) (0.0602) (0.0055)
Postt ×Dirtys 0.6034*** 0.6814*** 0.2072*** 0.0296***
(0.2033) (0.1195) (0.0724) (0.0076)
City-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 169,311 169,311 222,149 222,149 220,575 220,575 222,780 222,780
Adj R-Squared 0.753 0.753 0.907 0.907 0.917 0.917 0.870 0.870
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the city level are reported in
parentheses. All dependent variables are logarithmic. City-level controls include log per capita city GDP and log
city population.
A decrease in output, input and market share among firms might shed light on firms’
relocation, we therefore further test the impact of environmental regulation on firm entry
into new regions. Two variables Entry Num and Entry Capital, which denote log value of
the number of firms’ newly registered in a city and log value of their total registered cap-
ital, respectively, are introduced here.15 The significantly negative estimates in Columns
(1) and (2) in Table 10 show that, the relocation of firms to cities with stringent environ-
mental regulation plunged sharply compared with those in loosely regulated cities after
2006. The shrinkage of overall registered capital in highly regulated cities presents a sim-
ilar pattern, as shown in Columns (3) to (4). Their escape signifies, to a certain extent, an
"internal" variant of the pollution havens hypothesis.
15In the absence of information on industries of registered firms in SAIC, we only include the interaction
term Rc × Postt in our regression.
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Table 10: Entry Results
Entry Number Entry Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rc × Postt -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.193*** -0.194***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039)
City-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,860 2,860 2,860 2,860
Adj R-Squared 0.959 0.959 0.828 0.828
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard er-
rors clustered at the city level are reported in parentheses. All
dependent variables are logarithmic. City-level controls include
log per capita city GDP and log city population.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of environmental regulations on firms’ COD emissions re-
ductions. We find that with the advent of stricter environmental regulations, represented
by the differential emissions reduction targets set up in the Chinese 11th Five-Year Plan
after 2006, manufacturers have emitted less COD. More stringent environmental regula-
tions faced by firms is positively associated with a greater probability of reducing COD
emissions after 2006. Also, firms belonging to heavily polluting industries have since cut
down their pollutant use by much more when compared with their counterparts in less-
polluting industries. We find no such effects of the policy on other non-targeted pollu-
tants, such as NH3 and smoke and dust. Our analyses suggest that stricter environmental
regulations have induced firms to pay more efforts to COD emissions-related issues. By
constructing a comprehensive dataset, we execute a series of tests to determine the un-
derlying mechanisms affecting firms’ reactions to stringent environmental regulations.
With the stricter target control system in place, firms face a higher probability of receiv-
ing administrative penalties and are more likely to discharge less effluent, to consume
less industrial water by recycling water, and to adopt devices that control pollution as
well as expand their current pollution treatment abilities. However, we find no evidence
of an increase in green patents and water-related green patent applications, leading us to
believe that firms are, nevertheless, reluctant to increase environment-related innovation.
Our research has three important implications. First, as environmental regulations be-
come tighter, firms’ emissions fall. Tasked with meeting concrete emissions reduction tar-
gets, firms are consciously trading off between production arrangements and COD emis-
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sions. Overall, manufacturing firms in China are becoming green. Second, the industrial
infrastructure in China is becoming cleaner due to the expansion of cleaner industries,
while polluting industries are shrinking. As firms in heavily polluting industries are more
responsive to environmental regulations, their sharply declining output and the pollution
intensities of their production provide more evidence of the "composition effect". Third,
although clear reduction targets set during the 11th Five-Year Plan were effective, they
still failed to stimulate firms to adopt effective technology to eliminate more pollutants
from the production process, perhaps because other lower-cost countermeasures, such as
adoption of pollution abatement facilities, was sufficient to meet the target. Regulators
still face the fundamental challenge of indentifying an appropriate regulatory path that
will stimulate firms to shift from the adoption of end-of-pipe treatment technology to
"bright green" innovations.
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Appendix
Appendix A Dynamic Trend
Figure A1: Dynamics of Chemical Oxygen Demand Emissions
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients of environmental regulation stringency and year dummy
variables (controlling for the log per capita city GDP and log city population, and year and firm fixed
effects) and their 90% confidence intervals. The reference year is 2001.
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Figure A2: Comparison between Macro- and Micro- Data on Main Air Pollutants and
Control Facilities
Notes: The macro-data come from China Statistical Yearbook on Environment, and the micro-data come
from Annual Environmental Survey of Polluting Firms (AESPF) of China.
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Appendix B Summary Statistics
Table A1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. P10 P50 P90
Dependent Variables (logarithmic)
COD 437,253 8.297 2.511 5.109 8.312 11.420
Output 437,253 7.725 2.057 5.193 7.696 10.310
COD
Output 437,253 0.572 2.635 -2.708 0.543 3.895
SO2 301,439 9.596 2.080 7.021 9.643 12.130
NH3-N 232,430 5.897 2.586 2.625 5.937 9.083
Smoke and Dust 169,432 9.180 2.425 6.258 9.056 12.430
Effluent 435,555 10.440 2.255 7.518 10.490 13.250
Effluent
Output 427,583 2.719 2.170 -0.086 2.768 5.448
Industrial Water
Output 437,123 3.407 2.146 0.652 3.433 6.131
Fresh Water
Output 437,090 3.008 2.110 0.303 3.046 5.655
Facilities
Effluent 291,735 -10.690 1.967 -13.170 -10.810 -8.033
Facility Capacity
Effluent 283,386 -5.169 1.196 -6.502 -5.257 -3.689
Green Patent 437,253 0.0048 0.0772 0 0 0
Water Patent 437,253 0.0020 0.0456 0 0 0
Profit 169,311 7.688 2.246 4.836 7.711 10.52
Capital 222,149 9.824 1.780 7.673 9.772 12.08
Labor 220,575 5.555 1.150 4.111 5.481 7.115
Market Share 222,780 0.0349 0.173 0.00102 0.00657 0.0590
Entry Number 2,860 5.903 1.260 4.369 5.798 7.694
Entry Capital 2,860 12.15 1.364 10.51 12.12 13.90
Dependent Variables
Polluter Penalty Dum 437,253 0.042 0.200 0 0 0
Polluter Penalty Num 437,253 0.044 0.213 0 0 0
Independent Variables
Rc 437,253 1.080 1.089 0.163 0.677 2.981
Postt 437,253 0.619 0.486 0 1 1
Dirtys 437,253 0.073 0.098 0.003 0.030 0.144
Control Variables (logarithmic)
Log GDP per capita 437,253 9.964 0.903 8.841 9.921 11.140
Log Population 437,253 6.201 0.634 5.430 6.272 6.887
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Appendix C Summary of Pollution Intensity
Table A2: Summary Statistics of Dirty
Code Industry Dirtys
13 Processing of food 0.14403
14 Manufacture of foods 0.02482
15 Manufacture of beverages 0.04471
16 Manufacture of tobacco 0.00106
17 Manufacture of textile 0.06406
18 Manufacture of textile, clothing, and apparel 0.00298
19 Manufacture of leather, fur, and feather 0.01555
20 Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo, rattan, 0.00542
palm, and straw products
21 Manufacture of furniture 0.00110
22 Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.35164
23 Printing, reproduction of recording media 0.00035
24 Manufacture of articles for culture, education, and sport activities 0.00013
25 Processing of petroleum, coking, processing of nuclear fuel 0.02002
26 Manufacture of raw chemical materials and chemical products 0.11802
27 Manufacture of medicines 0.02956
28 Manufacture of chemical fibres 0.01880
29 Manufacture of rubber 0.00138
30 Manufacture of plastics 0.00074
31 Manufacture of nonmetallic mineral products 0.01121
32 Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 0.04087
33 Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals 0.00641
34 Manufacture of metal products 0.00396
35 Manufacture of general-purpose machinery 0.00328
36 Manufacture of special-purpose machinery 0.00272
37 Manufacture of transport equipment 0.00922
39 Electrical machinery and equipment 0.00191
40 Manufacture of communication equipment, computers, 0.00374
and other electronic equipment
41 Manufacture of measuring instruments and machinery for 0.00137
cultural activity and office work
42 Manufacture of artwork 0.00076
43 Recycling and disposal of waste 0.00013
6-11,44-46 Non-manufacturing 0.07002
Notes: The variable Dirtys is industry’s polluting intensity indicated by each indus-
try’s proportion of total COD emissions in all industries in 2005. 6-11 are mining
sectors and 44-46 are utilities sectors.
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Appendix D Using Different Measure of COD Regulation
Table A3: Results by Using Different Measure of COD Regulation
COD Output CODOutput
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rc2 × Postt -0.069*** -0.044 -0.015 -0.005 -0.054* -0.040
(0.024) (0.028) (0.011) (0.011) (0.029) (0.030)
Rc2 × Postt ×Dirtys -0.355*** -0.137** -0.218*
(0.116) (0.059) (0.122)
Postt ×Dirtys 0.315* 0.534*** -0.220
(0.183) (0.099) (0.190)
City-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253
Adj R-Square 0.801 0.801 0.885 0.885 0.782 0.782
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at
the city level are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are logarithmic.
City-level controls include log per capita city GDP and log city population.
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Appendix E Using Different Measure of Industry-Level COD Inten-
sity
Table A4: Results by Using Different Industry-Level COD Intensity
COD Output CODOutput
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rc × Postt ×Dirtys2 -0.074** -0.069** -0.007 -0.006 -0.067* -0.062*
(0.031) (0.030) (0.014) (0.014) (0.035) (0.032)
Rc × Postt -0.045* -0.056*** -0.017 -0.019 -0.028 -0.037
(0.026) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (0.029) (0.023)
Postt ×Dirtys2 0.078* 0.073* 0.086*** 0.086*** -0.008 -0.013
(0.040) (0.041) (0.022) (0.022) (0.042) (0.042)
City-level Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253
Adj R-Squared 0.800 0.801 0.885 0.885 0.782 0.782
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at
the city level are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are logarithmic.
City-level controls include log per capita city GDP and log city population.
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Appendix F Patent Classification
Table A5: Results by Patent Classification
Green Invention Green Utility Water Invention Water Utility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rc × Postt -0.00024 -0.00047 -0.00004 0.00002 -0.00017 -0.00022 0.00000 0.00006
(0.00024) (0.00035) (0.00027) (0.00038) (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00019) (0.00027)
Rc × Postt ×Dirtys 0.00349 -0.00182 0.00095 -0.00102
(0.00295) (0.00230) (0.00197) (0.00150)
Postt ×Dirtys -0.00537 -0.01543*** 0.00198 -0.00210
(0.00447) (0.00353) (0.00304) (0.00162)
City-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253 437,253
Adj R-Square 0.190 0.190 0.223 0.223 0.117 0.117 0.132 0.132
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the city level are reported in
parentheses. All dependent variables are logarithmic after adding 1. City-level controls include log per capita city
GDP and log city population.
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Appendix G Using ASIF data
Table A6: Results by ASIF Data
COD Output CODOutput
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rc × Postt -0.064*** -0.045*** -0.023** -0.016 -0.041** -0.029*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
Rc × Postt ×Dirtys -0.292*** -0.102 -0.191**
(0.077) (0.062) (0.085)
Postt ×Dirtys 0.135 0.311*** -0.177
(0.200) (0.109) (0.204)
City-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 222,780 222,780 222,780 222,780 222,780 222,780
Adj R-Squared 0.797 0.797 0.841 0.841 0.755 0.755
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at
the city level are reported in parentheses. All dependent variables are logarith-
mic. City-level controls include log per capita city GDP and log city population.
Results are robust when we control the firm-level controls include log size, log
capital-labor ratio and log age.
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